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Comment David W. Wilcox
Martin Feldstein has probably done more than any other person to high-
light the urgent need to reform our Social Security system and the poten-
tial beneﬁts of putting the system on an investment-based foundation. In
addition, he has personally conducted a goodly fraction of the seminal re-
search in this area and inspired others to undertake much of the rest. To
state the obvious, this conference volume—like many of its predecessors in
this subject area—would not have come to fruition without his eﬀorts, and
the research careers of many of the participants at this conference would
not have been nearly so rich without his beneﬁcial inﬂuence. When the na-
tion ﬁnally confronts the imperative of reforming the system, much of the
thinking surrounding the ensuing debate will have been shaped directly or
indirectly by Feldstein. For all of this, we owe him an enormous debt of
gratitude.
This chapter continues in the tradition of his pushing the research fron-
tier forward. In earlier work with Ranguelova and Samwick, Feldstein pro-
posed the idea of limiting the ﬁnancial risk associated with participation in
personal retirement accounts (PRAs) by having the government provide
an explicit guarantee.1 Although the probability of a draw on taxpayer
resources struck the authors as relatively low and the associated costs in
those cases seemed manageable, the idea was criticized, partly on the ap-
prehension that once a government guarantee had been agreed to in prin-
ciple, no matter how limited in its original form, the guarantee might be en-
hanced over time, ultimately becoming a considerable new burden on
taxpayers.
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The views expressed in this comment are those of the author and are not necessarily shared
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve or by the other members of its staﬀ. I am
grateful to many colleagues for helpful comments on an earlier version of these remarks.
1. See, among others, Feldstein, Ranguelova, and Samwick (2000).This chapter proposes an elegant remedy for that critique. Feldstein notes
that the objective of risk reduction can be achieved entirely through
market-mediated means. For example, a PRA investor who wants to be
guaranteed a minimum real return of zero percent can have each year’s con-
tribution invested in a mixed portfolio of Treasury Inﬂation-Protected
Securities (TIPS) and equities. The TIPS ensure that the guaranteed mini-
mum return will be paid, while the equities provide the potential for upside
risk. When participants are young, the fraction to be invested in TIPS is
relatively small; as participants age, the fraction to be invested in safe se-
curities rises. Similarly, as Feldstein notes, participants could limit their
downside risk by contracting for “zero-cost collars.” Under this approach,
participants would, in eﬀect, purchase put options to eliminate their down-
side risk and sell call options to ﬁnance the insurance. Both approaches
have the great virtue of never involving the government as guarantor; they
also recognize and operationalize the important idea that there is no need
to impose a one-size-ﬁts-all type of approach in an investment-based So-
cial Security system; individuals clearly diﬀer in their attitudes toward risk
and their ability to bear it, and policymakers ought to contemplate the pos-
sibility of allowing them to choose a PRA structure that is tailored to suit
their own attitudes and situations.
The fundamental idea behind these market-based approaches is appeal-
ing, creative, and convincing: Feldstein has demonstrated that market-
based mechanisms can be devised to sharply limit the risks associated with
participation in a PRA—mechanisms that keep the government at two
steps’ remove, and so substantially alleviate concerns about an implicit
contingent liability. Accordingly, my remaining comments are organized in
two sections. In the ﬁrst, I note two important methodological questions
that are raised by Feldstein’s paper. In the last section, I note some of the
other issues, aside from portfolio diversiﬁcation and the associated ﬁnan-
cial risk, that will likely ﬁgure in the debate as to whether individual ac-
counts should be part of the inevitable future reform of Social Security.
Two Questions
The conclusion that PRAs would be welfare-enhancing depends on the
treatment of transition costs and the speciﬁcation of a welfare function,
among many other factors. This section examines issues related to both
factors. The issues are framed as questions because I do not know the an-
swers and hope to encourage others to work on them.
Question #1: How Should Transition Costs Be Addressed 
in Analyses of Fully Funded Systems?
In the long run, a sustainable pay-as-you-go Social Security system can
pay a rate of return equal to the rate of growth of the population, n, plus
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variation, a fully funded system—whether administered on a centralized
basis with a trust fund or a decentralized basis with a system of personal
retirement accounts—can pay a riskless rate of return equal to r∗. Stan-
dard models predict that utility-maximizing individuals living in a sto-
chastic environment will not choose a portfolio that delivers the riskless
rate but will instead accept some risk as the price of a higher expected re-
turn, which I will denote as r. In this chapter, Feldstein compares plans de-
livering n   p to plans delivering various versions of r and concludes that
most people would be happier with the latter than the former.
As is well known by now, thanks especially to papers by Geanakoplos,
Mitchell, and Zeldes (1998, 1999), there is no inherent rate-of-return in-
eﬃciency in a pay-as-you-go Social Security system. Policymakers chose to
confer above-market rates of return on the ﬁrst generations to participate
in Social Security; the inexorable consequence of those decisions is that all
subsequent generations, taken as a whole, must experience a below-market
return on their participation. The issue of how best to distribute the bur-
den of paying for the net beneﬁt conferred on early participants is an open
question, but there is no debating the fact that someone will pay.
This chapter compares the status quo pay-as-you-go system to a fully
phased-in investment-based system. In so doing, it leaves aside the transi-
tion costs that would necessarily be associated with paying oﬀ the un-
funded liability built up under the current system. In light of the uncer-
tainty about how those transition costs will ultimately be borne, it is fair to
ask how they should best be reﬂected in an analysis like this one. Two ap-
proaches present themselves immediately; I have no doubt that these do
not exhaust the range of possibilities, but they illustrate that the underlying
issue can be addressed.
One way to take the transition costs into account would be to build on
the central insight of the papers by Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes
(1998, 1999), that a pay-as-you-go-system does not suﬀer from any rate-of-
return ineﬃciency. Accordingly, households in the aggregate should be in-
diﬀerent between the current pay-as-you-go system and the investment-
based alternative provided the PRA is invested entirely in TIPS. In the
Social Security Trustees’ Report for 2006, population is assumed to grow
about 0.3 percent per year in the long term (that is, between 2040 and
2080), productivity is assumed to grow 1.7 percent per year, and govern-
ment bonds are assumed to pay a 2.9 percent real rate of return. Thus, in
the world of the trustees’ projections, the necessary indiﬀerence condition
could be achieved by adjusting the assumed rates of return on TIPS and
stocks downward by 90 basis points.
Another way to take the transition costs into account would be to regard
the analysis in the chapter as providing part of the overall answer and aug-
ment it with an analysis of the welfare consequences of the investment-
220 Martin Feldsteinbased approach for the generations that bear the transition cost. A com-
plete apples-to-apples analysis could be produced by calculating the welfare
gain or loss of all future generations, recognizing both that the transition
costs are front-loaded relative to the beneﬁts thereof and that all subsequent
generations would presumably beneﬁt from the shift to full funding.2
Under either approach, if the model is calibrated appropriately, PRAs
will exhibit no welfare advantage over the pay-as-you-go system if house-
holds are required to invest the PRAs entirely in TIPS. Once that con-
straint is relaxed, however, many households will prefer PRAs because, as
usual, a certain amount of additional equity risk will be seen as desirable
given the higher expected rate of return.3
Question #2: What Welfare Function Should Be Used 
to Evaluate the Results of the Simulations?
The CRRA utility function used to conduct the welfare analysis in this
chapter yields counterfactual predictions on at least two issues of immedi-
ate relevance to the desirability of an investment-based approach to Social
Security reform:
• If CRRA were the right utility function and the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion were between one and ﬁve, the equity premium would
not have been declared a puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985). Put diﬀ-
erently, if everyone had the utility function posited in this chapter,
post-WWII returns on stocks and bonds would have had markedly
diﬀerent empirical properties.
• If CRRA utility were the right utility function, then—as my colleague
Sean Campbell has recently pointed out—the reduction in the volatil-
ity of real activity that seems to have occurred around the early- to
mid-1980s would have been accompanied by a proportionate reduc-
tion in the volatility of asset prices, but it was not (Campbell 2005).
The analysis in the chapter would be considerably more compelling if it
used a utility function capable of generating the posited distribution of as-
set returns. Thanks to some relatively recent research, that objective ap-
pears to be achievable.4
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2. Feldstein and Liebman (2002b) undertake an analysis of this sort and show that a tran-
sition to an investment-based Social Security system increases the present discounted value
of consumption of all current and future generations provided the marginal product of capi-
tal exceeds the discount rate applied to the future consumption.
3. Some households will be indiﬀerent to the constraint on portfolio holdings because they
will adjust the composition of their non-Social Security portfolio to oﬀset any change in the
composition of their Social Security portfolio.
4. For example, the habit-based utility function proposed by Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) can account for the behavior of the equity premium over the postwar period and, as
demonstrated by Sean Campbell (2005), it can also account for the failure of the Great Mod-
eration in real activity to be reﬂected in the volatility of equity returns.Other Considerations Relevant to the Evaluation of PRAs
If the current pay-as-you-go system and an investment-based system are
put on the same footing, and ignoring any lifetime wage insurance that
might be provided through the current system but not by simple versions
of individual accounts like the one studied here, the representative worker
will be indiﬀerent between the two systems if constrained to invest only in
the risk-free asset, but will strictly prefer the investment-based approach if
allowed to invest part of his or her portfolio in risky assets. What other con-
siderations should policymakers take into account as they consider this ex-
tremely important decision? The issue is not easy because serious argu-
ments can be made on both sides. The following strike me as some of the
most important of those arguments. First, as to the arguments in favor of
individual accounts:
• Personal accounts are naturally self-sustaining. Under a system of per-
sonal accounts, promised beneﬁts can never exceed available resources
because the only promise in a deﬁned contribution (DC) structure is
that each beneﬁciary will receive the proceeds of his or her own ac-
count. No solvency crisis can occur under such a structure; the pa-
rameters of such a system never need to be adjusted to put the sys-
tem back on a sustainable trajectory. By contrast, in a deﬁned beneﬁt
(DB) structure, the parameters can—and, as demonstrated by pres-
ent experience, do—get out of alignment with what is sustainable.
Moreover, the structure is not inherently self-correcting; unless self-
correcting mechanisms have been built into the structure (such as, for
example, indexing the retirement age to longevity), overt decisions
must be taken to bring the system back into sustainability. In practice,
these decisions can be delayed long past the time when they should be
made.
• A system of personal accounts is more credible as a vehicle for ensuring
that “saving” for retirement actually adds to the capital stock. A plaus-
ible argument can be made that the current system—while generating
$1.9 trillion in apparent saving since 1983 in the form of trust-fund ac-
cumulation—has generated little or no real government saving.5 This
argument runs as follows: if, since 1983, Congress and the president
have set their ﬁscal objectives in terms of the uniﬁed budget (for ex-
ample, they might have been aiming to produce a balanced uniﬁed
budget), then the Social Security surpluses that have been run during
that time have served only to facilitate larger non-Social Security
deﬁcits than would have occurred otherwise. In other words, the sav-
ing that should have been used to prepare for future retirements has
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5. To be sure, counterarguments can be made as well; see, for example, Diamond and
Orszag (2003).been dissipated. A system of individual accounts might be more likely
to preserve such saving for its intended use. If contributions into the
accounts are scored against the concept of the budget around which
the political conversation revolves—a plausible but not certain hy-
pothesis—then those resources might be seen as having been “taken
oﬀthe table,” and policymakers might be driven to choose a tighter ﬁs-
cal policy than under the current system. In other words, apparentsav-
ing through the Social Security system would translate one for one
into government saving. Whether that government saving would be
transmitted into national saving would depend on whether the added
saliency of the personal accounts would cause personal saving to de-
cline. Unfortunately, the issue of whether Social Security surpluses ac-
tually contribute to government saving is of diminishing importance
with each passing year because the time when Social Security sur-
pluses will turn into deﬁcits is drawing nearer.6 Beginning roughly a
decade from now, a ﬁscal policy anchored on the uniﬁed surplus or
deﬁcit will be more restrictive than one anchored on the balance ex-
cluding the current operations of the Social Security system.
• A system of personal accounts might impress upon individuals that they
have a responsibility for their own ﬁnancial security in retirement.A sys-
tem of individual accounts might foster a greater sense of individual
responsibility. In turn, that sense of individual responsibility could
contribute to an enhanced popular appreciation of how important it
is for individuals to behave in ways that are favorable to growth over
time.
• A system of personal accounts would open to everyone the opportunity to
bear some equity risk. For some individuals, failure to participate in
equity ownership, no doubt, represents a rational decision grounded
in considerations such as greater-than-average riskiness of own labor
income, greater-than-average aversion to risk, and so forth. For oth-
ers, however, it probably reﬂects considerations (such as high transac-
tions costs or basic ignorance about investing in the stock market) that
a system of personal accounts could help overcome. The magnitude of
any welfare gain that would result from breaking down these market
imperfections is diﬃcult to estimate.
• A system of personal accounts could reduce the price of risk and in so do-
ing could induce entrepreneurs to undertake a riskier set of investment
projects. Assuming risk is associated with return, the result could be an
economy with somewhat greater aggregate risk but also somewhat faster
average growth. If a system of personal accounts induces additional
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6. According to the 2006 Social Security Trustees’ Report, Old-Age, Survivors, and Dis-
ability Insurance (OASDI) costs (beneﬁts plus administrative expenses) will ﬁrst exceed tax
revenues in 2017; costs are projected to exceed overall OASDI income (including interest on
assets held in the trust fund) starting in 2027.demand for risky securities, it should also cause a reduction in the
price of risk. Confronted with a lower price of risk in ﬁnancial mar-
kets, entrepreneurs could, over time, choose to undertake a riskier
portfolio of investment projects. To my knowledge, no empirical basis
exists for judging whether any such shift would be important quanti-
tatively or negligible.
Now as to some of the considerations militating againstintroduction of in-
dividual accounts:
• Personal accounts could come to represent a major new liability for the
federal government. Over time, a system of individual accounts would
inevitably create wave after wave of “notch babies”—cohorts retiring
with noticeably lower accumulated assets despite having similar earn-
ings histories. Policymakers would face enormous political pressure to
insulate beneﬁciaries from the consequences of their investment deci-
sions and the vagaries of the market. The contingent liability associ-
ated with any such move could represent a signiﬁcant new ﬁscal bur-
den. Given that no Congress can credibly restrict the actions of future
Congresses, it is hard to see how the issue of the implicit put can be
avoided entirely.7
• In their simplest forms, personal accounts leave at best limited scope for
sharing risks, either within or across generations. The current system is
intended to provide a measure of social insurance: It provides insur-
ance against lifetime earnings risk by providing a higher replacement
rate for low-income workers than for high-income workers; it provides
insurance against disability; and it provides insurance against early
death, in the form of survivors beneﬁts for children of deceased work-
ers, widows and widowers with minor children, as well as widows and
widowers of retired workers. The current system also has the scope to
smooth risks across generations; in principle, this could include not
only demographic risks but also ﬁnancial risks. While some of these
features could be built into a system of individual accounts, they are
not inherent in the simplest versions of PRAs.
• Social Security may not be an appropriate vehicle for ﬁnancial risk-
taking. Social Security is intended to provide a foundation for ﬁnan-
cial security in retirement, but was never intended as more than that.
Under current law, Social Security promises a replacement rate of
about 42 percent for a typical worker near the middle of the earnings
distribution, but the current system is not sustainable. Assuming that
resources into the system are capped at the current 12.4 percent of
payroll, revenues will be suﬃcient to pay only about 70 percent of
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7. Kent Smetters (2001) has emphasized the enormous cost of explicit government guar-
antees.current-law beneﬁts by the middle of this century. Assuming revenue
of 12.4 percent of payroll, a sustainable replacement rate is probably
in the neighborhood of 28 percent. Personal-ﬁnance professionals
conventionally advise aiming to accumulate enough resources to pro-
vide an overall replacement rate of about 75 to 80 percent in retire-
ment. Thus, by the middle of this century, workers should be aiming to
replace about 50 percent of preretirement income out of some combi-
nation of employer pension beneﬁts and personal saving. Even a very-
risk-tolerant individual could probably satisfy his or her appetite for
equity-risk exposure even if prevented from holding any equity risk
through the Social Security system.
• Relative to the current Social Security system, personal accounts could
prove a costly means of transferring resources. In 2003, the cost of ad-
ministering the current Social Security system amounted to about 1
percent of beneﬁts paid. If the costs of an investment-based system
can be limited to 30 basis points per year, beneﬁts over a forty-year ca-
reer would be reduced by about 6 percent, or roughly six times as much
as under the current system. Estimates on the order of 30 basis points
are based on the idea of modeling an investment-based system on the
federal Thrift Saving Plan. However, such analysis has been heavily
criticized as too optimistic.8 Based on the costs of administering
private plans in the United States and the experience of foreign coun-
tries with privatized systems, some analysts have suggested that an-
nual costs in the neighborhood of 1 percent per year are more realis-
tic. Costs in this range would reduce annual beneﬁts by about 20
percent—a very sizable reduction in eﬃciency compared to the cur-
rent system.9
• A system of personal accounts might turn out to be signiﬁcantly more re-
gressive than suggested by simple simulations. The labor force attach-
ment of lower-income individuals is much more tenuous than that of
higher-income individuals. This can have important implications for
the distributional characteristics of a system of personal accounts. If
low-income workers have relatively more spells of unemployment,
they will experience relatively smaller account accumulations than
would be indicated by simulations based on hypothetical “steady
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8. For example, Francis Cavanaugh, the ﬁrst executive director of the federal Thrift Saving
Plan, is quoted in the Washington Post, March 3, 2005, as follows: “There’s no way they can
do this without an enormous federal subsidy....  T his has to do with workability, no matter
how one feels about it philosophically, and it’s not workable.” He also characterized the 
30 basis point estimate referred to in the text as “ridiculously optimistic.” See http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2367-2005Mar2.html.
9. Related concerns are that a system of PRAs might give rise to much greater “leakage” of
retirement saving during the preretirement years and that the introduction of PRAs might
cause individuals to choose to annuitize too little of their Social Security resources, leaving
themselves overexposed to the risk of outliving their resources.earners” whose earnings follow smooth trajectories over their working
careers. Feldstein and Liebman (2002a) conduct simulations of this
type using real-life earnings histories and demonstrate that this con-
cern can be addressed by a small change in the contribution or beneﬁt
rule.10
One consideration diﬃcult to categorize as either a pro or con is the scope
for participants in a system of PRAs to tailor their asset holdings to their
risk tolerances and individual circumstances. If all individuals are fully ra-
tional, this scope for choice will obviously be utility-increasing. If at least
some individuals are not fully rational, choice will be a mixed bag. The be-
havioral economics literature is replete with examples of individuals en-
gaging in nonrational ﬁnancial decision making.
Concluding Remarks
In demonstrating that the ﬁnancial risk associated with participation
in PRAs can be substantially mitigated through market-based mecha-
nisms—leaving government more convincingly out of the picture—this
chapter takes a signiﬁcant step forward. The analysis suggests that work-
ers would strongly prefer a fully funded investment-based system over the
current pay-as-you-go system. The margin of preference would obviously
be narrower if the costs of achieving full funding had been taken into con-
sideration; an important question is how much narrower. Future research
should address that question. It should also attempt to extend Feldstein’s
analysis to models that provide realistic accounts of why some individuals
do not currently invest in equities and realistic accounts of why the deci-
sion making of other individuals seems to be so heavily inﬂuenced by fac-
tors (such as default settings) that should be irrelevant according to con-
ventional theory. Aside from the welfare consequences of broadening the
menu of available investment vehicles, myriad other issues, both pro and
con, should also ﬁgure into the debate over whether to adopt a system of
individual accounts.
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